Over 100 years ago the British were in Afghanistan. What have we learned? Thanks to my sister-in-law for bringing this information to my attention.

Winston Churchill Assesses the Afghan Tribesmen (1897)

Commissioned as an officer in the Fourth Hussars and posted to his regiment in Bangalore, India, Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) offered his services to the Daily Telegraph as an expedient to get him to the Northwest frontier. On September 6, 1897, he posted a letter, in typically strong language, describing the qualities of the Afghan tribesmen then at war with the British Empire.

Let us begin, then, as we hope to end, with the enemy. In the examination of a people it is always best to take their virtues first. This clears the ground and leaves sufficient time for the investigation of the predominant characteristics. The Swatis, Bonerwals, Mohmands and other frontier tribes with whom the Malakand Field Force is at present engaged are brave and warlike. Their courage has been abundantly displayed in the present campaign. They charge home, and nothing but a bullet stops their career. Their swordsmanship—neglecting guards—concerns itself only with cuts and, careless of what injury they may receive, they devote themselves to the destruction of their opponents. In the selection of positions they exhibit considerable military skill, and as skirmishers their use of cover and preservation of order entitle them to much praise. It is mournful to be compelled to close the catalogue of their virtues thus early, but the closest scrutiny of the facts which have been placed before me has resulted in no further discovery in this direction. From year to year their life is one of feud and strife. They plough with a sword at their sides. Every field has its protecting tower, to which the agriculturalist can hurry at the approach of a stranger. Successful murder—whether by open force or treachery—is the surest road to distinction among them. A recent writer had ascribed to these people those high family virtues which simple races so often possess. The consideration of one pregnant fact compels me reluctantly to abandon even this hope. Their principal article of commerce is their women—wives and daughters—who are exchanged for rifles. This degradation of mind is unrelieved by a single elevated sentiment. Their religion is the most miserable fanaticism, in which cruelty, credulity and immorality are equally represented. Their holy men—the Mullahs—prize as chief privilege a sort of droit de seigneur. It is impossible to imagine a lower type of beings or a more dreadful state of barbarism.

I am aware of the powerful influence of climate upon character. But the hill man cannot even plead the excuse of a cold and barren land for their barbarism. The valleys they inhabit are fertile and often beautiful. Once the spots where their squalid huts now stand were occupied by thriving cities, and the stone ‘sangars’ from which they defy their foes are built on the terraces which nourished the crops of a long forgotten civilization. Everywhere are the relics of the old Buddhists on whom these fierce tribes, thrown out of that birthplace of nations, Central Asia, descended. Their roads, their temples, their ruins have alone survived. All else has been destroyed in that darkness which surrounds those races whose type is hardly on the fringe of humanity. But it may be argued, “However degraded and barbarous these people may be, they have a right to live unmolested on the soil that their fathers conquered.” “They have attacked your posts,’ says the Little Englander, carefully disassociating himself from anything British, “but why did you ever put your posts there?” To answer this question it is necessary to consider the whole matter from a wider point of view than the Swat Valley affords.

Starting with the assumption that our Empire in India is worth holding, and admitting the possibility that others besides ourselves might wish to possess it, it obviously becomes our duty to adopt measures for its safety. It is a question of a line of defense. The Indus is now recognized by all strategists as being useless for this purpose. The most natural way of preventing an enemy from entering a house is to hold the door and windows; and the general consensus of opinion is that to secure India it is necessary to hold the passes of the mountains. With this view small military posts have been built along the frontier. The tribes whose territories adjoin have not been interfered with. Their independence has been respected and, their degradation undisturbed. More than this, the influence of the flag that flies from the fort on the hill has stimulated the trade of the valley, and increased the wealth of its inhabitants. Were the latter amenable to logical reasoning, the improvement of their condition and strength of their adversaries would have convinced them of the folly of an outbreak. But in a land of fanatics common sense does not exist.

The defeat of the Greeks sent an electric thrill through Islam. The Ameer—a negative conductor—is said to have communicated it to the ‘Mullahs’, and they have generated the disturbance through the frontier tribes. The ensuing flash has kindled a widespread conflagration. This must now be dealt with courageously and intelligently. It is useless, and often dangerous, to argue with an Afghan. Not because he is degraded, not because we covet his valleys, but because his actions interfere with the safety of our Empire, he must be crushed. There are many in Europe, though they live amid the prosaic surroundings of a highly developed country, where economics and finance reign supreme, who yet regard, with pleasure and with pride, the wide dominions of which they are trustees.

These, when they read that savages have been killed for attacking British posts and menacing the security of our possessions, will not hesitate to say, with firmness and without reserve, ‘So perish all who do the like again.’

Source: See Frederick Woods, ed. Young Winston’s Wars: The Original Despatches of Winston S. Churchill, War Correspondent, 1897–1900 (New York: Viking, 1972), pp. 8–10

--------------------------------------------------------------------

MLA

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh "23. Winston Churchill Assesses the Afghan Tribesmen (1897)." Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism, 1800-1914: Volume 2, L-Z. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2007. ABC-CLIO eBook Collection. 1 Dec 2009.